Šutar Act Adopted: Exclusionary Rule Retained, While Police Powers Affecting the Inviolability of the Home and Privacy Are Expanded
The so-called “Šutar Act” has prompted intense public debate, as it raises fundamental questions about where the boundary should be drawn between legitimate security measures and undue intrusions into privacy. This article briefly outlines the legislator’s original proposals, identifies the more controversial measures that were subsequently abandoned, and highlights the measures that have nonetheless been retained despite sustained criticism.
On 18 November 2025, the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the Act on Emergency Measures to Ensure Public Safety (ZNUZJV), publicly referred to as the “Šutar Act.” The Act was adopted in direct response to the events surrounding the tragic death of Aleš Šutar. Within less than one month, the legislation was drafted and enacted, introducing an exceptionally wide range of measures aimed at ensuring public safety.
As early as its first reading in early November 2025, the draft ZNUZJV provoked a strong reaction, particularly within the expert community. The most forceful criticism from legal practitioners and academics focused on the proposed amendments to criminal procedure and the introduction of new police powers. Two proposals attracted particular attention: (i) a proposed amendment to the second paragraph of Article 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act (ZKP), which would have introduced an exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of human rights in cases involving criminal offences punishable by eight years’ imprisonment or more; and (ii) the introduction of a police power to enter and inspect another person’s dwelling, other premises, or means of transport for the purpose of the immediate seizure of weapons.
Following the receipt of numerous expert opinions and the consideration of an extensive set of amendments, the legislator adopted the final version of the “Šutar Act.” In doing so, it took account of the criticism concerning the proposed abolition of the exclusionary rule for unlawfully obtained evidence; as a result, this provision does not appear in the final text. Certain observations were also accepted in relation to the newly introduced police power to enter private premises and vehicles; however, unlike the former proposal, this regulation remains in force. Pursuant to Article 16 of the ZNUZJV, the police may, without a court order, enter a dwelling or other premises, as well as means of transport, and carry out an inspection for the purpose of seizing firearms where there is a probability that such weapons are concealed there and were used immediately beforehand to endanger individuals. This inevitably raises the question of whether such an intensive intrusion into privacy — in the absence of judicial oversight — is necessary and adequately regulated.
Slovenian legislation already confers on the police a number of instruments to address such risks, including in the absence of a court order. In situations of immediate danger, the police may, pursuant to Article 218 of the ZKP and Article 53 of the Police Tasks and Powers Act (ZNPPol), enter a dwelling or other premises without a court order where this is necessary to protect the safety of persons or property. In addition, Article 51 of the ZNPPol provides for a security search of a person, including the inspection of a means of transport, when police officers are verifying whether an individual is armed. Accordingly, the new regulation does not, in substance, introduce an entirely new police power; rather, it more precisely delineates the scope of existing police powers for the specific purpose of seizing firearms.
In addition, several ambiguities remain in the final version of the provision in question, notwithstanding extensive expert criticism. Of particular concern is the standard of “probability” set out in the second paragraph of Article 16 of the “Šutar Act,” which, under the ZNPPol, is understood as the (lowest) evidentiary threshold. Given the intensity of the interference with privacy, significantly more stringent admissibility criteria would be expected, as a lower evidentiary threshold increases the risk that the measure will be applied even in borderline cases, thereby heightening the risk of arbitrariness. The third paragraph is also problematic, as it provides that the measure must not constitute a house or personal search, while at the same time permitting the police to inspect premises, furniture, and objects in which firearms are typically stored—effectively encompassing everything that would ordinarily be examined during a house search. In both substance and intensity, the measure therefore corresponds to a house search, albeit under a different designation.
In conclusion, Article 16 of the “Šutar Act”, as adopted, raises serious concerns as regards proportionality and legal certainty. While security challenges undoubtedly call for a serious response, measures that interfere with fundamental rights must be designed with due care and in strict adherence to the principles of legal certainty, foreseeability, and legitimate trust in the law. Intrusions into privacy must be clearly and unambiguously regulated, properly justified, and constitutionally compliant. Failing this, there is a risk that such measures may exceed their original purpose and, over time, erode privacy and undermine public confidence in the functioning of public authorities.
